

Features of the National Front Losing in Malaysia's 14th General Election

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Abstract: National Front, with its concept of power-sharing between Malaysian's major ethnics, had managed to get resounding wins after wins in Malaysian General Election from 4th General Election to 11th General Election until it lost its two third majority in 12th General Election and 13th General Election and totally lost in 14th General Election. National Front's loss in Malaysia's 14th General Election baffled many political scientists who predicted it could still hold on to its simple majority despite the many governance issues plaguing it, especially the IMDB mega scandal that implicated Najib Razak, particularly because there was a split in the opposition coalition, Harapan Pact, due to PAS not joining it and due to the lack of institutional reform on the part of the government. However, despite the existence of three-cornered fights in almost all of the seats contested, and despite the re-delineation of the seats which heavily favoured National Front, it still lost in Malaysia's 14th General Election. This study is an attempt at discussing on why National Front still lost in Malaysia's 14th General Election despite its usage of the tested racial and religious issues, despite the split in the opposition coalition and despite the lack of institutional reform. This study finds that National Front's loss in Malaysia 14th General Election was due to the roles played by foreign institutions which were helped by the existence of a very strong internal leader, Mahathir Mohamad. Both of these factors help Harapan Pact overcome National Front's strategy of using three-cornered fights to win Malaysia's 14th General Election. At last in the end it was proven that the strategy, although did help National Front to win in 39 seats contested, failed to prevent National Front from losing in other seats in Malaysia's 14th General Election due to the highly strong intensity of people's rejection of both Najib Razak and National Front.

Index Terms: IMDB, Harapan Pact, Institutional Reform, General Election, National Front, Opposition Coalition.

I. INTRODUCTION

Malaysia's 14th General Election on May 9, 2018 has passed since its decision is quite meaningful and shocking Malaysians as well as the world community. Unexpectedly many political observers, the formation of the National Front (BN), on June 1, 1974 that replaced the Alliance which had been established since before independence, for the first time suffered a defeat at the hands of the opposition pact, Harapan Pact (PH), which was just established at 22 September 2015 (People Justice Party (PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP), Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia Party (PPBM) and Amanah Negara Party (PAN), 2015).

The full result of Malaysia's 14th General Election is set out in Table 1 where it can see that Harapan Pact won a simple majority of 113 out of 222 seats and if mixed with a historical seat, the Harapan Pact for political co-operation, 8 seats then it increased to 121 seats. National Front had 79 seats namely 47 through UMNO, 2 through MIC and 1

through MCA in Peninsular Malaysia; 13 through UN, 3 through PRS, 2 through PDP and 1 through SUPP in Sarawak; as well as 7 through UMNO, 1 through PBS, 1 through PBRS and 1 through UPKO in Sabah. PAS also won 18 seats while Free and Solidarity each won 3 and 1 seats (Result General Election 2018) respectively.

The results of the Malaysia's 14th General Election are considered to be significant and shocking in the circumstances in which there is a split in the opposition pact, Harapan Pact, because of the absence of PAS in it resulting in almost all the seats contested, a three-cornered fight, especially those involving National Front, Harapan Pact and PAS.

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Table 1: General election result on 9th May 2018 [21]

State	HP	NF	PAS	WARISAN	BEBAS	Solidarity	Total
Perlis	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
Kedah	10	2	3	0	0	0	15
Kelantan	0	5	9	0	0	0	14
Terengganu	0	2	6	0	0	0	8
Pulau Pinang	11	2	0	0	0	0	13
Perak	13	11	0	0	0	0	24
Pahang	5	9	0	0	0	0	14
Selangor	20	2	0	0	0	0	22
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur	10	0	0	0	1	0	11
Wilayah Persekutuan Putrajaya	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Negeri Sembilan	5	3	0	0	0	0	8
Melaka	4	2	0	0	0	0	6
Johor	18	8	0	0	0	0	26
Wilayah Persekutuan Labuan	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Sabah	6	10	0	8	0	1	25
Sarawak	10	19	0	0	2	0	31
Total	113	79	18	8	3	1	222

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This situation shows that the results of the 14th General Election are also considered as shocking in the absence of institutional reforms on the part of the government which saw the country's institutions under control of Najib Razak (Najib) as Prime Minister. This has resulted, the most anticipated impact is that the Election Commission's action creates a re-delineation of the National Front's favorable seat just two months before the 14th general election. Somewhat surprising is that when racial and religious issues have proven to be successful in the Alliance and National Front in the previous General Election, as can be seen in Table 2, it is unable to maintain National Front in power in Malaysia’s 14th General Election while in the Malaysia’s 13th General Election, 14 racial and religious issues are played pretty well.

Table 2: Performance of national front/alliance party from 1st general election until 14th general election [21]

General Election	Seat Win	Total Seat	% Seat Win
GE 1: 1959	74	104	71.15
GE 2: 1964	89	104	85.58
GE 3: 1969	74	144	51.39
GE 4: 1974	135	154	87.66
GE 5: 1978	130	154	84.42
GE 6: 1982	132	154	85.71
GE 7: 1986	148	177	83.62
GE 8: 1990	127	180	70.56
GE 9: 1995	162	192	84.38
GE 10: 1999	148	193	76.83
GE 11: 2004	199	219	90.87
GE 12: 2008	140	222	63.06
GE 13: 2013	133	222	59.91
GE 14: 2018	79	222	35.59

The prediction of National Front's victory in the 14th general election has been pretty much made by well-known

political analysts in and outside the country, but also by reputable survey agencies as well, since the beginning of 2017. On March 24, 2017, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, the third holder of Tun Hussein Onn's chair at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), said that National Front and Najib would be able to remain in power in Malaysia’s 14th General Election. Furthermore, a three-cornered competition, redemption, conversion the polling station as well as seat allocation will benefit National Front and National Front also have a majority of votes in Sabah and Sarawak, following a conflict in the Malay opposition which makes the opposition's position decline. This gives advantages to National Front despite the support by the number of votes is much lower than the opposition ("National Front predicted to win", 2017).

Thus, on June 20, 2017, Liew Chin Tong, a DAP strategist, revealed that non-Malay support to the opposition had dropped from 85% in Malaysia 13th General Election to 65%. He further said, National Front was weak but Harapan Pact was not strong because of his leadership. This is because it has not been ascertained whether Anwar and Mahathir and their supporters have full confidence in each other as well as developing a genuine alliance. He also mentioned that it is very difficult for Harapan Pact win in Malaysia’s 14th General Election because it can only happen if there is a wave of voters who usually vote UMNO this time divert their vote to another party ("Liew Chin Tong, DAP strategist", 2017).

Meanwhile, on December 12, 2017, The Asia Institute Director at The University of Tasmania, James Chin, wrote that although on its surface Najib appears to be having problems with 1MDB scandals and with Mahathir leading Harapan Pact, he is in fact very safe and in a strong position. The co-operation between Najib and Abdul Hadi creating a three-cornered fight will enable National Front to win the majority of Malay seats and will win Malaysia’s 13th



General Election. The 1MDB scandal, James said, did not get a "political traction" and would be considered a stale story by Malay voters in rural areas while part the urban voters do not trust Mahathir and think Mahathir just wants to use the opposition to acquire power only ("Najib set to strengthen", 2017).

This situation can be explained again on February 3, 2018 when Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani from University of Utara Malaysia wrote that Harapan Pact has no clear agenda on Islamization, what else to fight for the rights of the Malays causes it to fail to be an alternative to National Front. Hence, the majority of Islamic voters, especially Malay Islamic voters, will continue to support UMNO and National Front to cause Harapan Pact votes to be reduced and National Front will continue to win in Malaysia's 14th General Election ("Islamic agenda", 2018).

Furthermore, on February 14, 2018, Sivamurugan Pandian from University of Science Malaysia and Jeniri Amir from University of Malaysia Sarawak also expressed their opinion that National Front will be comfortable in Malaysia's 14th General Election. Hence Sivamurugan was saying that the voters' sentiments will be in favor of National Front this time due to the internal split of the opposition, the strength of Najib's post after the elimination of Muhyiddin Yassin and Shafie Apdal from the Cabinet as well as the strength of National Front's position in Sabah, Sarawak and the rural areas. Jeniri also mentioned the internal dissolution of the opposition as well as the improved perceptions of the National Front as a result of National Front's commitment to solving the people's problems, adding that National Front had a good chance of regaining its 2/3 majority due to the three-cornered competition and re-delineation of the selected areas. This statement is similar between James Chin and Jeniri who stated that the 1MDB scandal did not get "traction" among rural voters ("National Front, Najib has upper hand", 2018). This view was repeated by them on May 7, 2018 ("National Front to romp home", 2018).

Next on March 6, 2018, Michael Yeoh of the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (ASLI) predicts that National Front will win between 125 and 140 seats in Malaysia's 14th General Election because Harapan Pact will not be able to overcome the power of incumbent Najib and National Front. Furthermore, all the indicators pointed to UMNO winning more seats in Malaysia's 14th General Election than the amount he won in Malaysia's 13th General Election, where he expected Umno to gain between 85 and 100 seats ("Likely outcomes of Malaysia's 14th General Election", 2018) [15].

It is not surprising that on 26 April 2018, Ibrahim Suffian of the Merdeka Center disclosed that the outcome of the survey which he did a week earlier, despite the shift of support to Harapan Pact among Malay voters in certain states, it was not enough to allow Harapan Pact to defeat National Front. This is because, he said, in order to enable Harapan Pact to win in Malaysia's 14th General Election it required 14% support of Malay voters further in addition to the 20% support of existing Malay voters. He also expects Harapan Pact not to face problems in defending Selangor and Penang, but it will not be able to win in other states. He added that the large number of attendees at Harapan Pact

lecture sessions in rural areas and FELDA settlements were also not significant enough to change the government ("Malay tsunami 'not strong enough", 2018) [16].

Subsequently on May 4, 2018, Syed Arabi Idid from Kajidata Research disclosed that the results of the survey which he conducted from 12 to 27 March 2018 involving 1,021 respondents from all over the country showed that 40.3% of respondents said National Front would win over 29.9% said Harapan Pact would win in Malaysia's 14th General Election while 20.5% of respondents chose Najib as Prime Minister against 16.7% and 13.3% of respondents who chose Mahathir and Anwar respectively. Based on this finding, he expects National Front to win with a simple majority in Malaysia's 14th General Election ("National Front likely to prevail", 2018).

Meanwhile, on May 7, 2018, Thomas Pepinsky from Cornell University stated that despite the competition in the Malaysia's 14th general election it was fierce, the decision was clear that National Front would win because it had the power of incumbent who had legal resources, the infrastructure and material that he always used to win in the controlled elections in Malaysia ("Clash of political titans", 2018).

The situation was extended on May 8, 2018, Ibrahim Suffian of the Merdeka Center revealed that the latest survey on 1,579 registered voters involving 70 marginal seats in Peninsular Malaysia on April 28 to May 8 led them to conclude that National Front will win Malaysia's 14th General Election National Front still leads Harapan Pact with 100 seats compared to 83 seats. This is because the support of Malay voters to Harapan Pact is still at 27.6% compared to support of Malay voters to National Front and PAS at 44.3% and 28.1% respectively ("Merdeka Center's final poll", 2018).

Based on the prediction of National Front's victory in Malaysia's 14th General Election which has been widely made by well-known political analysts in and out of the country, even by a reputable survey body, since the beginning of 2017, it is interesting to examine what factors cause their predicted missed of the actual results produced in this Malaysia's 14th General Election.

III. METHODOLOGY

The study will try to find the factors that cause the predictions of well-known political analysts in and out of the country, and even the reputable body of surveys as well, since the beginning of 2017 again, on the result of the Malaysia's 14th General Election outcome of the actual results generated in this Malaysia's 14th General Election. This study is qualitative and content analysis of press releases, speeches, interviews and media content (content analysis) [5]. The interview has been conducted with individuals who are full of information and this information can be fully utilized to reinforce the findings of this study. The research instrument is using the recording then analyzed descriptively and arranged according to the priorities and requirements of this study.



The other qualitative methods to be used are structured interviews with local political leaders who are directly or indirectly involved in Malaysia's 14th General Election, either from the National Front, Harapan Pact or the Gagasan Sejahtera (GS). The selection of respondents in this structured interview was selected based on several criteria of their involvement before, during and after the General Election. Furthermore, their involvement is focused on key issues in the 14th General Election either directly with journalistic institutions or indirectly as in social media. These informant data are very important to be analyzed and considered in accordance with journalism writing in this interview. These data are sufficient and complement the analysis of this study.

Five (5) of the local political figures are comprised of Amanah Party leaders namely Mohd Normarzuki Yaacob, Speaker of the Kelantan Trust and Treasurer of Pasir Puteh; Mohamad Sabu, President of Amanah Party, Minister of Defense and Member of Parliament Kota Raja, Selangor; Salahuddin Ayub, Deputy President of Amanah Party, Minister of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry, Pulau Member of Parliament and Simpang Jeram ADUN; Johor; Khalid Abdul Samad, Amanah Party Communications Director, Federal Territories Minister, and Shah Alam Member of Parliament, Selangor; and Dzulkefly Ahmad, Director of the Strategy of Amanah Party, Health Minister and Member of Parliament of Kuala Selangor, Selangor.

Five (5) of the local political figures are PAS leaders namely Khairuddin Aman Razali, Central PAS Working Committee Member, PAS Ulamak Council Member and Kuala Nerus Member of Parliament, Terengganu; Nasrudin Hassan Tantawi, PAS Information Chief, Council Member of Syura Ulamak PAS and Former Member of Parliament Temerloh, Pahang; Mohammad Fadzli Dato' Hassan, Central PAS Working Committee Member, Kelantan State PAS Deputy Commissioner III, Chairman of Kelantan Human Development, Education and Higher Education Committee, and Temangan State Assemblyman Kelantan; Mohd Zuhdi Marzuki, Director of PAS Research Center and Member of Central PAS Working Committee; and Mohd Amar Nik Abdullah, PAS vice-president, Kelantan Deputy Chief Minister and Panchor assemblyman Kelantan.

Three (3) of these local political figures are UMNO leaders namely Annuar Musa, UMNO Secretary-General and Member of Parliament Ketereh; Mohd. Syahbuddin Hashim, Gua Musang Umno division deputy chief and Galas assemblyman Kelantan; and Md Alwi Che Ahmad, UMNO Supreme Council Member and Kok Lanang Assemblyman, Kelantan.

Three (3) of the local political figures are comprised of PKR leaders namely Mohd Sukirman Mustafa, Former Kelantan PKR Communications Director and PKR Ketereh Branch Vice-Steward; Noor Amin Ahmad, PKR Head of Kangar Branch and Member of Parliament Kangar, Perlis; and Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, PKR Former President, Deputy Prime Minister cum Minister of Women, Family and Community Development, and MP for Pandan, Selangor.

Three (3) of these local political figures are comprised of PPBM namely Mohd Soberi Shafii, Head of the Kelantan Expectate Secretariat; Abu Bakar Yahya, Member of the Supreme Leader Council and Political Secretary to the Prime Minister and Chairman of the PPBM, Mahathir

Mohamad; and Marzuki Mohamad, Special Officer to Home Minister and PPBM, Muhyiddin Mohd Yassin.

Two (2) of these local political figures are DAP leaders, Young Syefura Othman, DAP Women National Assistant Secretary and Ketari Assemblyman, Pahang; and Kasthuriraani Patto, DAP Women's International Secretariat, Member of Parliament for Batu Kawan, Penang.

One (1) of the local political figures is the Warisan Party leader, Jo-Anna Sue Henley Rampas, Deputy Head of Wirawati Warisan Party and Political Secretary to Sabah Chief Minister and Warisan Party President, Mohd Shafie Apdal.

Structured interviews are also made with seven (7) local academicians involved directly or indirectly with Malaysia's 14th General Election, either from Peninsular Malaysia or from East Malaysia. These local academicians are composed of Zainal Bin Md. Zan at the School of Government Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Kedah; Iskandar Hasan Tan Abdullah, Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, UiTM Machang, Kelantan; Jeniri Amir at the Faculty of Languages and Communication Studies, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS); Ahmad Martadha Mohamed at the School of Government Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Kedah; Mohad Anizu Mohd Nor at Faculty of Sports and Recreational Science at UiTM Shah Alam, Selangor; Mohd Fuad Mat Jali at the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Selangor; and Mohamed Mustafa Ishak, Former Vice-Chancellor of Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Kedah.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Minister of Finance Incorporated (MKD) from Terengganu Investment Authority Berhad (TIA) established by Terengganu Menteri Besar Incorporated (MBI Terengganu) on February 27, 2009 to establish Sovereign Wealth Fund) with an initial fund of RM11 billion. Following the Terengganu MBI protest over a program agreement signed between TIA and AmInvestment Bank Berhad for the issue of Islamic Medium Term Notes (IMTN) issues amounting to RM5 billion on May 15, 2009, the Federal Government has decided to take over the TIA. The process was successful on 31 July 2009 and on 25 September 2009 the TIA name was changed to 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB).

Subsequently, on the same day, 1MDB's goals and objectives have also been transformed from being a national wealth fund under TIA to a fully-owned strategic development company owned by MKD with an authorized capital of RM1 billion and paid-up capital of RM1,000,002. Through the civil suit filed by the Department of Justice, the United States, (DOJ) on July 20, 2016 and on June 15, 2017, more than \$ 4.5 billion of 1MDB's funds have been stolen by some individuals, including government officials and their allies for the personal interests of the planners and their families and allies ("US Seeks to Recover", 2017) [14].



Harapan Pact

The opposition coalition refers to the political co-operation created by opposition parties, which are often ideological differences, among their peoples in a coalition which is usually formal to meet certain goals, which often is to defeat a ruling party or coalition in an election on the basis that the opposition parties alone cannot afford to do so.

In Malaysia, the most famous opposition pact is the Ummah Perpaduan Ummah (APU) and the People's Gapasan (GR) established by GE after the release of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah from UMNO earlier. This was followed by the Barisan Alternatif (BA) set up by Malaysia 10th General Election after Anwar Ibrahim's exit from UMNO earlier. Following this, Pakatan Rakyat (PR) was formed after the trium Harapan Pact of opposition parties in Perak, Kedah, Selangor and Penang in Malaysia's 12th General Election and Harapan Pact which was set up by Malaysia's 14th General Election after the breakup of the previous PR [6].

Institutional Reform

Institutional reform refers to the process of improvements made to government institutions to make these institutions more responsible, more effective, more transparent, more free, more democratic and so on in carrying out their functions [7].

In Malaysia, among the key government institutions being targeted for reform are institutions seen under the control of the Prime Minister such as the Election Commission (EC), the Malaysian Attorney General's Chambers (AGCM), the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Malaysian Royal Police (PDRM), Bank Negara Malaysia (National Front), the Malaysian Judicial Appointment Commission, the Human Rights Commission and so on [8].

Delimitation

Under the constitution, delineation refers to the process of reviewing the Federal and State parliaments by the Election Commission to the constituency and recommending any alterations to it which it deems necessary under conditions shall be a period of not less than eight years between the date of completion of a study again with the date of the subsequent review [9].

There are four principles as far as possible to be taken into account in making this delimitation namely:

- i. The constituencies should be bound to not cross the State boundaries and should also be concerned with the difficulties of the State constituencies across the borders of the federal elections;
- ii. Attention should be given to the administrative facilities available in the constituency to provide the necessary registration and polling machinery;
- iii. The number of voters in each constituency in a State should be approximately the same except that, taking into account the greater difficulty of reaching voters within the rural district and the other difficulties faced by the constituencies in rural areas, the size measure of the area should be given to the constituencies;
- iv. Attention should be given to the difficulties that will arise with changes in the constituencies and to the maintenance of local relations.

Since attaining independence on August 31, 1957, a total of 6 delineations were held for the Malayan States. These 6 redefinitions are [10]:

- i. The re-delineation in 1958 provided for 104 Federal Elections Division and 282 State Elections Division.
- ii. The re-delineation in 1974 provided for 114 Federal Elections Division and 312 State Elections Division.
- iii. The re-delimitation in 1984 provided for 133 Federal Elections Division and 351 State Elections Division.
- iv. The delimitation in 1994 provided for 145 Federal Elections Division and 394 State Elections Division.
- v. The re-delimitation in 2003 provided for 166 Federal Elections Division and 445 State Elections Division.
- vi. The re-delineation in 2018 which still provides for 104 Federal Elections Division and 282 State Elections Division but only changes its boundaries or names.

Our study begins with the assertion in chapter one that the result of Malaysia's 14th General Election is quite meaningful and surprisingly in a situation where there is a split in the opposition pact, in a situation where there is no institutional reform on the part of the government, especially when redistribution of National Front-profit seats exists, and in a situation where racial and religious issues play quite well in Malaysia's 14th General Election.

This is despite the predictions of many political analysts and survey agencies that National Front will win in Malaysia's 14th General Election, which include six political analysts in the country, Jomo Kwame Sundaram of ISIS, Liew Chin Tong from DAP, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani from UUM, Sivamurugan Pandian from USM, Jeniri Amir from UNIMAS and Michael Yeoh from ASLI; two domestic survey bodies namely Ibrahim Suffian from Merdeka Center and Syed Arabi Idid from Kajidata Research; as well as two foreign political analysts, Thomas Pepinsky from Cornell University and James Chin from The University of Tasmania

It is also called that individuals like Hishamuddin Rais give credit to National Front's defeat in Malaysia's 14th General Election to Mahathir although he himself cannot explain it while individuals like Rafizi Ramli dismissed claims that Mahathir was the cause of National Front's defeat [18]. Individuals like Gunasegaram and KINIBIZ give credit to National Front's defeat in Malaysia's 14th General Election to the 1MDB mega scandal although he himself does not elaborate on how the 1MDB mega scandal issue contributes to National Front's defeat [11].

Through the discussion in chapter two, we can see how the selected works that Malaysian politicians have ever seen on the General Election and re-delineation in Malaysia have shown that most of them, especially James Chin, Ong Kian Ming, Wong Chin Huat and Bridget Welsh, acknowledged on the large structural barriers expected to curb Harapan Pact from achieving Malaysia's 13th General Election, but the term they use is either "impossible" or "almost impossible".



Opinion from Ong Kian Ming said based on his research on the collapse of DPAR-DPAR in Mexico, Taiwan, Senegal and Paraguay, the split in National Front alone was not enough to knock it down, but that it required institutional reforms such as reducing the delineation process, happened because without the reform of this institution it was proven that the National Front had been defeated in Malaysia's 14th General Election caused the theory to be modified [20].

This paper also revolves around racist and religious strategies used by UMNO to deal with opposition parties in the face of Malaysia's 14th General Election, highlighting that only UMNO is capable of safeguarding the interests of the Malays and Muslims, that UMNO is a PAS companion and Harapan Pact is the enemy of PAS, that the interests of the Malays and Muslims will be jeopardized if Harapan Pact won the Malaysia's 14th General Election and that Najib is a private Muslim.

Among the methods used in this strategy is to highlight the Bumiputera Economic Agenda and the Shariah Maqasid Agenda which special attention is given to Najib, giving way to PAS to enforce hudud laws and to organize certain occasions to show the unity of UMNO and PAS, it is argued that Harapan Pact is dominated by anti-Islam and anti-DAP and includes Najib with language and religious events, including qasidah and salawat programs [13].

The 1MDB case can pose a huge threat to Najib and National Front where initially local leaders and local media such as Anwar Ibrahim, Tony Pua, Rafizi Ramli, Now Biz, The Edge Markets and Mahathir themselves play a role early on to expose the 1MDB issue to the public's attention but this was not so successful until the issue was exposed by international media such as The New York Times on February 8, 2015, the Sarawak Report portal on February 28, 2015 and The Wall Street Journal on July 2, 2015.

However, the huge impact given by these external institutions, in particular by The Wall Street Journal, whose exposure to the RM2.6 billion inclusion into Najib's personal accounts led the internal institutions to investigate them through the initiative of Abdul Gani Patail as the Attorney-General in collaboration with the MACC, Malaysia's Royal Police and National Front, failed to produce the right result when Najib acted strongly to fire Abdul Gani, as well as Muhyiddin Yassin, to investigate the 1MDB issue that the MACC still trying to proceed with afterwards faced various problems, when the MACC itself began to show infertility there is a change of leadership.

At the time Najib was reaffirming his position, opposition leaders were faced with problems following the burial of Rakyat Pact resulting in the formation of Harapan Pact which however suffered severe defeats in the 11th Sarawak PRN on May 7, 2016 and Kuala Kangsar and Sungai Besar by June 18, 2016 and prosecution Lim Guan Eng was in court on a bribe charge on June 30, 2016. Nevertheless, Harapan Pact suddenly received a new spirit injection when DOJ filed on July 20, 2016 a civil suit to seize 17 worth more than \$ 1 billion worth of assets purchased by the stolen money from 1MDB fund.

During the disclosure of the DOJ civil suit that MO1 received a USD681 million in his personal account on or about 21 and 25 March 2013 had a major impact on the

Malaysian political world, including raising the # CaptureMO1 rally on August 27, 2016 and the BERSIH 5 on 19 November 2016, a bigger impact occurs when another civil suit DOJ filed on June 15, 2017 to seize 16 more assets valued at about USD540 million purchased using the money stolen from the 1MDB fund, focusing on the purchase of a pink diamond worth USD27.3 million to MO1's wife on or about September 10, 2013 [12].

In addition to causing Harapan Pact to drive the 1MDB Tour across the country starting from July 6, 2017 and ending on October 14, 2017, this DOJ civil suit also accelerates the union in Harapan Pact that immediately appoints Mahathir as Chairman of Harapan Pact on July 13, 2017 and as a candidate for Prime Minister Harapan Pact at 7 January 2018 besides forcing Najib to arrange a working visit to the United States to find Donald Trump on 11 to 13 September 2017 to restore his image but this visit blazes his image [17].

Through discussion in this paper, it can be seen how racist and religious strategies used by UMNO to deal with opposition parties in the face of Malaysia's 14th General Election have failed. Najib's image as a personal Islamist as well as the image of UMNO as the keeper of the interests of the Malays and Muslims is uncertain when exposure to disclosure is made about Najib's involvement in the 1MDB issue [4] and when UMNO leaders defended Najib even though Najib was proven involved in the 1MDB issue. Although these disclosures only concern when it is issued by external institutions, but plays an important role are internal figures, especially Mahathir, who use these exposures to understand the rural population about it [19].

The protests that the interests of the Malays and Muslims will be wiped out if Harapan Pact won the Malaysia's 14th General Election is also uncertain when the appearance of Mahathir as Chairman of Harapan Pact and the candidate of Prime Minister Harapan Pact gives confidence to Malays and Muslims that their interest will remain awake even if Harapan Pact won Malaysia's 14th General Election. Likewise with the highlights that UMNO is a PAS friend and Harapan Pact is PAS's enemy who cannot be defended due to the destruction of the image of PAS as an Islamic fighter because PAS leaders are portrayed as conspiring with Najib even though Najib is proven to be involved in the 1MDB issue, even worse PAS leaders are described as benefiting from 1MDB funds.

This paper also cover up how the political readings that three-cornered fight strategy will help National Front in Malaysia's 14th General Election is a fairly correct reading, but the aid is only in reducing the impact of the defeat of National Front alone, and if this strategy is converted into a coalition strategy between National Front and PAS then National Front can still be rescued from defeat where the possibility of a coalition between National Front and PAS achieving a simple majority victory is possible even though the number of seats they will win may be slightly reduced due to the factor of hateful sentiments to Najib.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the overall discussion in this study, then we can conclude that Malaysians are deeply indebted to the great role played by these external institutions in defeating Najib and National Front in Malaysia's 14th General Election, where these external institutions in particular are DOJ through his civil suits as well as international media such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal as well as its Sarawak Report portal Clare Rewcastle Brown, with the help of Tong Kooi Ong, has obtained a copy of data from PetroSaudi's servers containing thousands of documents stating the theft 1MDB money.

It should be noted that the disclosures issued by these external institutions are used by internal figures, including Mahathir, to attack Najib and National Front. More than that, when a figure like Tony Pua was threatened by Najib for alleged Najib committed a crime by robbing money from 1MDB's fund, Tony Pua's defense was that he merely repeated the allegations made by Sarawak Report and The Wall Street Journal and confirmed by the evidence presented in the DOJ civil suit which has never been challenged or denied by Najib.

The very important role played by these external institutions cannot be diminished by anyone, but it is even accredited by Mahathir who wrote on July 26, 2016 that, although they did not want to be led by a leader who stole billions of government money, the people Malaysia cannot do anything because MO1 regulates enforcement agencies causing them to rely on actions by foreign countries. Mahathir said that when thieves are police watchdogs and prosecutors, only foreign intervention can bring justice [3].

In his article on October 17, 2018, Hishamuddin Rais even claimed that if he was asked whether there was an outburst to bring Najib and UMNO on May 9, 2018, he was only using open source intelligence which required a person to collect, archive and analyze all the news in question, will answer there. He said, when on February 8, 2015 The New York Times detonated the news of Jho Low and 1MDB, this was a sign of the beginning of a western media attack on Najib, "The New York Times newspaper is a news archive for the CIA, understand-understand the meaning" ("Western media conspiracy", 2018).

For the purpose of our study, whether the outward involvement exists or not is not important, where the data obtained are non-existent that external involvement exists, but what is more important is that the disclosure of external institutions as if The process of moving uniformly does indeed have a tremendous impact on the result of the Malaysia's 14th General Election. The term "external engagement" also has a negative connotation whereas what can be seen clearly is its impact leading to the birth of good governance where, as the words Mahathir, when thieves are police watchdogs and prosecutors, only foreign intervention can bring justice [2].

Therefore, based on the results of this study, it can be concluded that the opinion of Ong Kian Ming should be modified to make a split in the DPAR such as National Front alone is not sufficient to bring it down because it requires institutional reform, but although the reform of this institution does not exist, the DPAR can still falling with the help of external institutions [1].

In conclusion, the National Front is still losing in Malaysia's 14th General Election Malaysia's 14th General Election despite the existence of a three-cornered competition and although there is no institutional reform because of the support of these external institutions, but external institutions alone without the help of internal figures, especially Mahathir, remain will not be able to bring National Front's defeat in Malaysia's 14th General Election.

Ultimately, the defeat of the National Front in Malaysia's 14th General Election is due to the rejection of voters against Najib where, for the majority of voters, racial and religious issues, although relevant, have been drowned by a good governance issue symbolized by the words that "non-Malay leaders and non-corrupt non-Muslims are much better than the Malay and Muslim leaders who are stuck with mega corruption like 1MDB".

Despite the existence of a three-cornered competition and despite the absence of institutional reform, the people's tsunami to make a change is too big, in which, in the words of Jeniri Amir, the perception of the people is that if Najib and UMNO fighters of Islam and Islam are certainly not will be involved with the 1MDB bribery scandal, and Lim Guan Eng, although non-Malay Muslims but have integrity and good governance, are more acceptable as Finance Ministers than Najib, who are Malay Muslims but have integrity problems and do not conduct good governance.

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